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A primary goal of health insurance reformers is to move consumption away from
the high-cost, low-value health care, which is a major driver of the growth of health
insurance costs. Some “expensive treatments, such as stents for cardiovascular disease,
are high value for some patients but poor value for others”.1 There is also “a large
and expanding set of treatments, such as proton beam therapy or robotic surgery,
that contribute to rapid increases in spending despite questionable health benefits”.1
Although “estimates vary, some experts believe that less than half of all medical care
is based on or supported by adequate evidence about its effectiveness”.2 In some sectors of health care, “off-label” prescriptions – those that are being used for purposes
where the Food and Drug Administration has not reviewed efficacy – account for half
of all prescriptions.3
Broad-based initiatives, such as Choosing Wisely,4 Clinical Evidence,5 Less is
More,6 National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence,7 and recent reviews,8
focus on identifying which procedures provide minimal or no benefit. In the US, no
single solution has been proposed to drive adoption of these recommendations by the
medical community. There are political, legal, and market limits that prevent insurers
and physicians from simply rationing care, at least in the US. While a physician-based
approach to cost containment for low-value, low-cost interventions must be a central
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Abstract: Traditional cost sharing for health care is stymied by limited patient wealth. The
“split benefit” is a new way to reduce consumption of high-cost, low-value treatments for which
the risk/benefit ratio is uncertain. When a physician prescribes a costly unproven procedure, the
insurer could pay a portion of the benefit directly to the patient, creating a decision opportunity
for the patient. The insurer saves the remainder, unless the patient consumes. In this paper,
a vignette-based randomized controlled experiment with 1,800 respondents sought to test the
potential efficacy of the split benefit. The intervention reduced the odds of consumption by about
half. It did so regardless of scenario (cancer or cardiac stent), type of split (rebate, prepay, or
health savings account), or amount of split (US$5,000 or US$15,000). Respondents viewed the
insurer that paid a split as behaving fairly, as it preserved access and choice. Three-quarters of
respondents supported such use in Medicare, which did not depend on political party affiliation.
The reform is promising for further testing since it has the potential to decrease spending on
low-value interventions, and thereby increase the value of the health care dollar.
Keywords: insurance, payment, reform, incentive, benefit

Dovepress

Robertson et al

Innovation and Entrepreneurship in Health downloaded from https://www.dovepress.com/ by 108.20.232.50 on 21-Oct-2020
For personal use only.

component in bending the cost curve, voluntary adoption
of the recommendations by physicians, based on guidance
from expert panels, suffers from slow adoption and may be
contrary to professional norms and incentives.1

The limits of traditional cost sharing
Cost sharing is the most commonly discussed approach to
this issue of moral hazard, where patients consume low-value
care without regard for cost. Some public and private insurers are changing cost sharing policies by increasing co-pays,
co-insurance, and deductibles. These “consumer-directed
care” policies are designed to cause patients to weigh the
benefits of such procedures against a portion of the costs, and
they work to reduce consumption without harming health,
in some situations.9,10
Cost sharing does not, however, work for highly expensive treatments, far beyond the scale of patient wealth.
Instead, insurers provide annual limits on their beneficiaries’
out-of-pocket obligations. Most workers (59%) have cost
sharing obligations capped at some amount less than
US$3,000 per year.11 “Once consumers reach the limits of the
deductible, they have little reason to limit their consumption
of health care or to pay attention to its price.”12
While an obvious solution is to simply raise the limits,
in a world of limited patient wealth, such increases begin to
defeat the purpose of insurance (pooling risk and guaranteeing access to care).13 Consequently, some patients refuse
high-value care, and others who stretch to buy care are forced
to declare bankruptcy.9,14–17

The split benefit model
This article tests a novel solution in health insurance
policy design, called a “split benefit”, focusing on high-cost
interventions for which the value is uncertain. Currently,
insurance is provided as an “in-kind” benefit, which is paid
directly to the provider; this creates a sunk cost, thereby
biasing decisions toward consumption. In the split benefit
model, the insurer can split the benefit between the beneficiary and the provider.18 The insurer pays the provider only
if the patient consumes.
For example, for an expensive (say, US$50,000) procedure that the physician prescribes and the insurer must cover,
the insurer will pay to the patient a fraction of the charge for
the treatment (say, US$5,000). Then, the patient will have the
option of using that US$5,000 for the treatment, with the
insurer matching by paying the US$45,000 to the provider as
usual. Or, the patient could keep the US$5,000 for some other
purpose, which can vary. While preserving the risk-reducing
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feature of insurance, the split benefit makes part of the
insurance benefit fungible, causing the patient to weigh the
value of the treatment against other consumption alternatives.
If patients decline the expensive, unproven treatment, the
health insurer will save the balance (US$45,000).
The payor can exercise the split benefit as a unilateral
option whenever it is most likely to save money. It is consistent with current insurance contracts and regulations since
it does not change coverage or the size of the benefit. It does
not “ration” care, which the Medicare statute prohibits. Of
course, the split benefit is not intended for inexpensive care
where traditional cost sharing works. It is also contraindicated
for high-value care, like vaccinations, and for care that is so
frivolous that the insurer can exclude its coverage altogether.
A vast swath remains between these poles.
The split benefit can be used alongside other cost-control
mechanisms, including traditional cost sharing, exclusions
of coverage, pre-authorizations, and fail-first policies. If the
split is only a small fraction of the total cost of the procedure,
the insurer can make several such payments for each instance
of full-cost care that is deterred on the margin.

Empirical questions about
the split benefit concept
This split benefit proposal raises important empirical
questions. Would it actually save money? What size payment will be the “sweet spot” that saves the most money for
the insurer at the least risk of wasteful payments on those
who would not have consumed anyway? Which of the various ways that a split could be given – paid in advance, paid
as a rebate of premiums for patients declining to consume,
or deposited into a health savings account – would be most
effective? Would beneficiaries view their insurers negatively
if they paid a split benefit?
Ideally, these questions would be tested in real-world pilot
experiments with sick patients and real money on the line.
However, given the expense, logistics, and ethical limitations
of such research, it is worthwhile to start with a laboratory
study for this novel concept of health care reform. This article
reports such an experiment.

Experimental methods
The Supplementary material provides detail, but in short:
the concept was tested with subjects participating as “mock
patients” in an online randomized experiment, using
clinical vignettes, depicting decisions about whether to
consume high-cost, low-value treatments. After collecting
demographic information and asking about their source
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of insurance coverage (if any), participants were asked to
imagine that they were ill, facing a health care decision.
Two clinical vignettes depicting off-label use of expensive procedures were used: heart stent and cancer drug.
Hundreds of thousands of drug-eluting coronary stents are
implanted each year for preventative purposes, with charges
of US$30,000–US$100,000 each, even though they are not
proven more effective than the cheaper and safer standard of
care.1,19 Likewise, oncologists routinely use patented drugs,
like Avastin® (Genentech Roche, San Francisco, CA, USA),
with charges of over US$80,000 for a course of treatment,
for many conditions where they are unproven to provide any
benefit.3 Halfway through the vignettes, the subjects were
asked to write a few sentences about how they would respond
to the scenario, just to increase engagement with the decision.
Both vignettes were pilot tested and refined for clarity and
content prior to use in the experiment described below.
Using a (two diseases × three types × two amounts) factorial design, these mock patients were randomized into either
of the vignettes and into one of six split benefit conditions
(manipulating type and amount of split) or control conditions
(one for each disease). Each subject was randomized to a
single condition. “Control” explained that the patient enjoyed
full insurance, having surpassed annual cost sharing maximums. “Prepay” is a payment via bank check that the patient
receives in advance of the health care decision, and simply
keeps if they decline care. “Rebate” is an offer of payment
after the decision is made, conditional on declining care, and
is framed as a “rebate” of insurance premiums. “Limited” is
also a prepayment, but paid into an account with fungibility
limited to other health expenses, similar to a health savings
account. Two levels of split (US$5,000 and US$15,000) were
compared for each payment method.
Based on prospective power analyses (discussed in
the Supplementary material), the study sought to recruit
1,800 participants to each review a single vignette in betweensubjects design. “Exempt” approval was received from the
Human Subjects Protection Program at The University of
Arizona (Tucson, AZ, USA), and a task was designed on
Amazon Mechanical Turk (Amazon.com, Inc., Seattle, WA,
USA), paying US$0.75 per respondent. Amazon Mechanical Turk’s screening feature was used to limit respondents
to those within the US geographically. It was specified that
respondents must be 18 years of age, and be able to read and
write English.
After excluding respondents who failed to complete
the task – those who did so in unreasonably long or short
times – and duplicate records, there were 1,763 responses.
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Qualtrics® (Qualtrics, LLC, Provo, UT, USA) was used to
randomly assign the respondents, yielding 425 in control, 449
in limited, 447 in prepay, and 447 in rebate conditions. There
were 664 respondents for the US$5,000 payment condition
versus 679 in the US$15,000 payment condition.

Results and statistical analyses
Respondents
The study population was 52% male. In terms of education,
11% had graduated high school or had less education, while
40% had some college or an associate’s degree and 49% had
a bachelor’s degree or more (including 12% with advanced
degrees). Ages ranged from 18–74 years, with a mean of
32 and a median of 28. In terms of race and ethnicity, 83%
of the study population reported being white, along with 6%
reporting being black or African American, and 7% Asian.
A remaining 4% reported being American Indian, Native
Hawaiian, or other races. Politically, after flattening the sevenlevel scale, 21% identified as Republicans, 18% as Independents, and 61% as Democrats. The most common income
range was US$20,000–US$29,999 (15%) and two-thirds
of the respondents had family incomes below US$59,999.
Table 1 shows the insurance status of respondents. The modal
respondent (33%) had private insurance through a current
or former employer or union, with another 15% insured
through the spouse’s employer (total 48%). The next most
common response was uninsured (24%). For the non-elderly
population nationally, this compares to 56% getting insurance from employers and 18% being uninsured.20 Of those
who had insurance, 31% reported that they were in a “high
deductible health plan”. One in seven (14%) reported that
they had a health savings account. None of these variables was
Table 1 Insurance status of responders
Insurance status

%

Private insurance through my current or former employer or union
No, I am not currently covered by a health insurance plan
Private insurance through my spouse or partner’s current or
former employer or union
Private insurance bought directly from an insurance company or
HMO, or through a broker
Other, or I don’t know
A state’s Medicaid program
Medicare
CHAMPUS, Tricare, CHAMPVA, Veterans Administration, or
other military health care
Indian Health Service, a tribal health program, or urban Indian clinic
Total

33%
24%
15%

6%
6%
4%
2%
0%
100%

Abbreviations: CHAMPVA, Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Veterans
Administration; CHAMPUS, Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services; HMO, health maintenance organization.
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Efficacy in reducing consumption
As the primary dependent variable, respondents were
asked about the likelihood that they would consume the
offered health care on a six-point Likert scale, which was
converted to a binary outcome for analysis. The split benefit
substantially reduced intent to consume. Across conditions,
a large main effect appeared (Figure 1). In the control condition, 55% of respondents expressed an intention to consume,
while across all split conditions, only 37% did so (odds ratio
[OR]: 0.48, confidence interval [CI]: 0.38–0.60, P,0.0001).
The effect was especially strong in the cancer scenario, moving respondents from 69% in the control condition to 42%
across all splits (OR: 0.32, CI: 0.23–0.45, P,0.0001). An
effect also appeared in the stent scenario, moving respondents from 42% consuming to 33% consuming (OR: 0.67,
CI: 0.49–0.92, P,0.01).
The proportion reporting an intent to consume, split by
experimental condition, is shown in Figure 1. The variations as to type of payment did not differ in their efficacy
in reducing intent to consume (P=0.40). Only within the
cancer scenario was there a significant difference between
the US$5,000 and the US$15,000 split.
Finally, it was checked whether the flattening of the sixlevel scale for intent to consume to a binary variable had the
consequence of discarding interesting information. As shown
in Figures S1–S3, no interesting differences were observed.

Regression models
The logistic regression analyses, accounting for demographic
factors and disease type, predict intent to consume – the primary dependent variable. As shown in Table S1, compared
to the control condition (the reference of 1.0), the prepay
condition reduces consumption very significantly (OR: 0.48,
CI: 0.36–0.64), as does the limited condition (OR: 0.51,
CI: 0.38–0.69) and the rebate condition (OR: 0.43, CI:
0.32–0.57).
The various split benefit conditions also manipulated
whether the insurer paid a US$5,000 versus a US$15,000
split. The levels of payment were indistinguishable in their
effectiveness (OR: 0.94, CI: 0.75–1.17, P=0.59). This finding is promising, because it suggests that insurers can use
small splits that expose them to very little risk of losing
money on net.

Perceived fairness of insurer
Respondents overwhelmingly thought that the insurer treated
them very fairly, regardless of whether it paid a split benefit
(Figure 2). Nonetheless, there were slightly different levels of
agreement (P=0.01), with higher fairness rating in the control
(95%) and prepay (95%) conditions than the limited (92%)
and rebate (90%) conditions. The amount of split made no
detectable difference on this dependent variable (P=0.16).

Support for reform in Medicare
Support for the idea of using the split benefit as a reform
to Medicare was also examined. Overall, broad support
was found, with 74% somewhat supporting, supporting, or
strongly supporting the reform. As shown in Figure 3, the
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significantly associated with the primary dependent variable,
intent to consume (insurance status χ2[4]=3.85, P=0.43; high
deductibles χ2[2]=0.19, P=0.66; or health savings accounts
χ2[2]=5.16, P=0.08).

Cancer
0.7

Overall
Stent

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
Control

Any
split

Prepay
split

Rebate
split

Limit
split

US$5 k
split

US$15 k
split

Figure 1 Intention to consume by experimental condition.
Notes: *Statistical significance (P,0.05) in Yates-adjusted χ2 tests; n=1,768.
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100%
95%

95%

Control

Prepay

92%

90%

75%

50%

25%

0%
Limited

Rebate

Split benefit
Figure 2 Perceptions that “insurer treated me fairly” by experimental condition.
Notes: Agreement includes those responding “strongly agree”, “agree”, or “somewhat agree” on a six-point Likert scale; n=1,768; χ2(3)=10.62; P=0.01.

support did not depend on political affiliations, with Republicans (n=366, 70%), Independents (n=321, 77%), and Democrats (n=1,081, 74%) showing similar favorability (P=0.18).
Lower income individuals were slightly more supportive of
using the split benefit in Medicare (77% versus 71%, OR:
1.36, CI: 1.17–1.59, P,0.01).
For the Medicare reform questions, the types of split
benefit in the primary “support reform” question were not
specified. Respondents were subsequently asked, “What if
the proposal included a feature that required that people who
keep the split must deposit it in a health savings account,
so that the money could only be used for future qualified
health expenses? Would that make you more, or less, likely
to support the proposal?” On a seven-point Likert scale,

Discussion
The foregoing results are promising, as they suggest that
the split benefit could be useful as a way for public and
private insurers to reduce consumption of the high-cost,
low-value care that drives much of health spending. And,
they can do so without reducing access or infringing on
patient choice. Indeed, the data suggests that insurers have
flexibility as to how they pay a split, in the amount and type.
What if the split could only be used
for other health expenses?

Little variation by
political affiliations or incomes
100%

100%

80%

80%
77%

60%

nearly two-thirds of the respondents (64%) indicated that it
would make them more likely (including somewhat and much
more likely) to support the proposal if so limited. As shown
above, such a limited payment may be equally effective at
reducing low-value care.

70%

74%

77%

71%

60%

40%

40%

20%

20%

0%

Rep

Ind

Dem

Politics

Low

High

Income

0%

64%

23%

23%

Less

No change

More

Support

Figure 3 Support for split benefit as Medicare reform.
Notes: n=1,768; politics: P=0.18; income: P=0.01.
Abbreviations: Rep, Republicans; Ind, Independents; Dem, Democrats.
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Those paying a split will be perceived fairly, since after all,
the only effect of a split is to increase the patient’s wealth
and options.
This pilot study had a number of limitations. First, it used
clinical vignettes in which patients were asked to imagine
themselves in future situations, and to decide on that basis
what they would do. The null results found with regard to type
and amount of split may be due to the hypothetical nature
of the task. Although respondents were asked to write about
how they would feel in the situation, real patients may have
a more profound emotional response, which would affect
their treatment decisions. Second, the respondents were
recruited from an online population that, although reasonably
diverse, was not a demographically valid sample representing any particular insurance pool. Third, it used vignettes of
two different medical domains where the split benefit might
be utilized to reduce off-label consumption of expensive
products. The reform might have larger, or smaller, effects
in other contexts. Finally, the demographics of the study
population varied substantially in comparison to the US
population. The subject pool included fewer people at the
very bottom of the education range (less than high school or
General Educational Development [GED]), and fewer people
at the high end of the age range (over 65 years). The study
population is also somewhat less diverse in terms of race
and ethnicity. The study population also skewed to the left
politically, compared to the national population. As shown
in the regressions, across all these demographic factors, in
logistic regression it was found that only sex was associated
with the primary dependent variable, intent to consume (OR:
1.32 CI: 1.09–1.61, P=0.004).
While the results are promising, several objections to
the split benefit model come immediately to mind. Some
have to do with “gaming” the system. Under such a reform,
insurers would need to carefully regulate their strategies to
minimize the risk of patients seeking split benefit payments
for care that they otherwise would not have consumed anyway. Insurers could impose “fail first” policies, for example,
that required patients and their providers to try standard of
care treatments before even considering a treatment that
might qualify for a split benefit payment. Patients choosing
to forgo treatment in favor of the cash payment would not be
eligible for full insurance coverage should they opt for the
same intervention at some later stage. Since the split benefit
would only be implemented for low-value interventions,
individuals would still be eligible for insurance coverage
for standard of care treatment for subsequent conditions or
events. Even with these stipulations, there would likely be
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some degree of false demand stimulation. However, the split
benefit reform may save money on net, if the payments are
relatively small compared to the charge for the treatment. If
an insurer can save US$45,000 by paying US$5,000, several
instances of false demand can be tolerated, even while saving
money on net.
The legal, clinical, and ethical implications of the split
benefit model have been discussed in detail previously.18
Importantly, once a split benefit is paid, it functions in exactly
the same way as a traditional co-insurance obligation. The
advantage of a split benefit is that the strategy is not stymied
by patient wealth. Unlike traditional cost sharing the burden
does not undermine access to health care or drive anyone
into bankruptcy or foreclosure.
One might recommend that the only interventions eligible
for the split benefit model are those lacking clinical evidence
of benefit. Unfortunately, a very large proportion of US health
care spending has this character. For these interventions,
where the clinical risk/benefit ratio is unclear, the payment
of a split benefit does not make patients worse off than they
would otherwise be. The decision to forgo treatment in these
circumstances cannot be construed as choosing suboptimal
care, because in this vacuum of evidence, it cannot be said
that consumption is better than declining care.
The split benefit approach is most readily implemented
by insurers in a fee for service payment model, and may
help counteract some of the misaligned incentives that exist
in those models. Under a capitation payment model, the
provider instead bears the risk that patients will consume
expensive health care. In principle, such providers could pay
split benefits to patients as well. However, such an active role
may undermine the relationship between patient and provider
as it sharpens the conflicting interests.
The split benefit has been proposed not only as a way
for private insurers to reduce the cost (and/or increase the
actuarial value) of health insurance, but also as a reform
for public insurers such as Medicare, seeking the same
improvements. Reforms to such public programs are often
highly contentious, and often polarizing between the political
parties. Remarkably, the respondents in this study seemed
generally supportive of the split benefit as a reform and did
not polarize along party lines. Future public opinion survey
research – with demographically valid samples – is necessary,
but these results are promising.
Ultimately, the split benefit is attractive because, while
cutting costs for insurers and insurance buyers, the mechanism keeps the consumption decision in the hands of the
patients. For insurance buyers and political representatives,
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the split benefit will thus be a more attractive solution than
further expansion of traditional cost sharing or outright
rationing, which can stymie choice and reduce access. A powerful approach to increase the value of the health care dollar,
where value is the quotient of outcomes/costs, is to decrease
either utilization or spending on low-value interventions. The
split benefit model can potentially accomplish both.
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